When Miracles Dont Happen: The U.S. Interest in EU-Turkey Relations
By Bruce
Clark
Adjunct
Fellow, Western Policy Center
Special to the Western Policy Center
October 17,
2003 - Never spend too much time longing for something to happen, because
one day you might get your wish and find it is not a miracle cure for all
your woes. That piece of homespun wisdom must often be recalled, these
days, by American diplomats in Turkey.
For many
years, the United States has been coaxing that country toward better
relations with western Europe -- and imploring a reluctant European Union
to accept Turkey as a candidate for admission. Given that Turkey was a
fast-growing, fast-changing Muslim society adjoining several conflict
zones, it seemed obvious to Americans that the Turks should be helped to
look westward, not eastward.
Now that old
policy goal seems within sight of fulfillment. As part of its preparations
for a European future, Turkeys parliament has made a historic move toward
downgrading the shadowy power of the military-controlled National Security
Council and making the country more like a normal democracy, where elected
civilians give orders to generals, not vice-versa. The government has also
begun to ease restrictions on minority languages and faiths, and improve
the countrys poor human rights record.
If the pace
of change in Turkey remains steady and intentions turn into reality, the
EU should finally be ready, by the end of next year, to open formal entry
talks with Ankara. In other words, democracy is deepening -- and becoming
irreversible -- in a Muslim country that plays a pivotal role in the
Middle East. That, if you recall, was precisely the result that the Bush
administration said it was pursuing when it invaded Iraq.
So why is
nobody in Washington cheering? The answer is that, as Turkish-European
relations have started to improve, Turkish-American relations have
plummeted, especially since the Turkish parliament voted in March to deny
the use of Turkish soil for the U.S.-led assault on Iraq. In fact, one
reason why Turkey and western Europe are getting along better is that, in
both places, America-bashing abounds. Consider a poll by the Pew Research
Center in May indicating that 83 percent of Turks had an unfavorable
opinion of the United States, up from 55 percent last year.
So the United
States faces two questions: how, if at all, can it mend its own fences
with Turkey, and should it still bother to encourage a closer relationship
between the Turks and the Europeans?
The first
question has no instant answer. Currently, the U.S. is trying to persuade
the Turkish government to dispatch peacekeeping troops to Iraq to give
some relief to American soldiers. But, even if these deliberations bear
fruit, it is far from clear that the U.S.-Turkish rift will be healed.
Turkish opinion remains deeply reluctant to send troops to Iraq in support
of American policy, and Iraqs embryonic government also seems queasy about
accepting Turkish protectors. If, despite these factors, Turkish troops go
to Iraq and suffer casualties under U.S. leadership, ordinary Turks will
be enraged.
Behind this
negative climate lies the hard fact that American and Turkish interests in
northern Iraq have diverged. Turkey wants to strike out against the
Kurdish fighters who fomented a 15-year civil war in Turkey, while the
U.S. needs as many Kurds as possible to back its ongoing struggle against
remnants of Saddams regime. Perhaps these differences can eventually be
finessed, but there are no magic wands.
What about
the second, more subtle dilemma? Is it still in Washingtons interests to
keep the Turks and Europeans on friendly terms? A Machiavellian cynic
could argue the contrary. Since Washingtons best friends in Turkey have
often been the generals, why should the United States support a change,
such as membership in the EU, that will downgrade their power? And, in the
end, wouldnt Turkey feel a greater incentive to snuggle up to the United
States if it were kept outside the European door?
Such thoughts
may be tempting, but it would be highly irresponsible to act on them
because Turkish democracy and, indeed, the country itself are more fragile
than they seem. If Turkey is now inching toward a stable European future,
that can be attributed to a delicate equilibrium between the secularist
military and the ruling party of moderate Islamists.
Both of these
groups want Turkey to be accepted by elite western and European
institutions, but not at any price. The generals are suspicious of Europe
because it will force Turkey -- in the name of religious freedom -- to be
more tolerant of devout Islam. Some Islamist voters baulk at the EUs
insistence on tolerance toward non-Muslim minorities.
But, despite
these risks, Turkeys pro-European consensus is, so far, holding out, and
it would not be in any Western countrys interests for that consensus to
collapse. Moreover, a Turkey alienated from Europe, with dire consequences
for its political stability and investment climate, would not be a useful
friend to anybody. And, lastly, the failure of the Muslim worlds boldest
attempt at pluralist democracy would send a dreadful signal to other
Islamic countries.
What, in
particular, can Washington do? At this time, one of the biggest risks --
and biggest opportunities -- with respect to Turkeys march toward Europe
lies on the island of Cyprus, where soldiers from Turkey and EU member
Greece still confront each other. There is a slim and probably short-lived
chance that the islands Turkish-Greek standoff, and, hence, a long-running
Turkish-European problem, could be resolved in the run-up to next May,
when Cyprus is due to join the EU.
Washington
should do what it can to encourage the Turks, the Greeks, and other
Europeans to jump through that window. More generally, Americans should be
applauding more enthusiastically every time Turkey moves toward a
democratic European future by mending fences with neighbors, liberalizing
its constitution, deepening civil liberties, or reforming its economy.
Those friendly American cheers will not bring about a miracle or instantly
reconcile the Turks and the Americans, but the derailing of Turkish
democracy is still well worth avoiding.
Bruce Clark, an Adjunct Fellow at the Western Policy Center, recently began a research sabbatical from The Economist magazine, where he has worked since 1998 as International Security Editor, specializing in the Balkans, post-communist transition, trans-Atlantic relations, and peacekeeping issues.
