Regime Change in Iraq: Repercussions for Turkey By Cengiz Candar Special
to the Western Policy Center For many experts on
the U.S.-Turkish relationship, the "acid test" concerning this
relationship is likely to come with the long-awaited American military
campaign in Iraq aimed at ousting Saddam Hussein's regime. Whether such an
operation will ever take place is still an open question. Yet it remains
the focal point of the divergence of interests between the United States
and Turkey. Otherwise, bilateral relations appear to be exemplary. Bilateral relations in
the military and political spheres reached their peak with the 1991 Gulf
campaign against Iraq. Because of the policy adopted by then Turkish
President Turgut Ozal, the strong cooperation between Turkey and the
United States during the U.S.-led Gulf War opened a new page in relations
between the two NATO countries, whose alliance over the past half century
has had its ups and downs, stemming primarily from the Cyprus problem and
tensions in Turkish-Greek relations. During the post-Cold
War period following the Gulf War, U.S.-Turkish relations have undergone a
structural change. In 1991, with the aim of diversifying the relationship
and making it more significant, a new concept called "enhanced
partnership" was promoted. This involved five major areas of
cooperation: energy, economic and commercial relations, regional
cooperation, Cyprus, and defense and security cooperation. As two close allies,
Turkey and the United States are consulting each other in the fight
against terrorism, in containing regional conflicts, and in preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Joint activities being
carried out by the United States and Turkey in Bosnia and Kosovo within
the context of the SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping operations, as well as in
northern Iraq, are important examples of their regional cooperation. Iraq is one area where
there has been effective and significant cooperation between the United
States and Turkey over the past decade. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990, Turkey exhibited solidarity with the United States by halting Iraqi
oil exports through Turkey and by permitting U.S. air strikes on Iraq from
Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. This bilateral
cooperation continued with "Operation Provide Comfort," which
provided humanitarian relief and protection for Iraqi Kurds in the wake of
the 1991 Iraq campaign, and continues today with "Operation Northern
Watch," through which U.S. and British planes based at Incirlik
enforce the no-fly zone in northern Iraq above the 36th parallel and
prevent Saddam Hussein from having authority over the region. Turkey's
cooperation with the United States is essential to Washington's policy
toward Iraq and to the implementation and success of the U.N. embargo
against Baghdad. The events of
September 11, while reshaping Washington's global strategic
considerations, led the White House to give Iraq even higher priority in
the American strategic outlook. The U.S. administration, ostensibly, is
committed to removing Saddam's regime, a factor that has strengthened
Turkey's geopolitical value even further. When assessing this situation,
Turkish policymakers, including the influential military top brass, have
emphasized that the "enhanced partnership" between the two
countries could be elevated to the level of a "strategic
partnership." Nonetheless, the
perception that the September 11 attacks strengthened Turkey's
geopolitical value cannot dispel the equally important perception that
Turkey will be in a precarious position if an American-led military
operation against Iraq takes place. On one hand, Turkish
authorities, above all the military, are keen to cooperate with the United
States in order to preserve the newly attained closer bilateral
relationship and develop it even further. This is especially imperative in
view of the U.S.-guided, IMF-supervised, strict economic program underway
in Turkey, which is designed to overcome the gravest economic crisis in
the country's history. On the other hand,
Turkey's highest officials, ranging from Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit
to Chief of the General Staff General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, have never
missed an opportunity to voice their dissent regarding the possibility of
an American military operation against Iraq. Turkish objections to such an
operation have, at times, been publicly stated and have, at times, been
muted, but they have never been totally withdrawn. An analysis by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled Turkey's
New Optimism states: "The Turkish prime minister has no doubt noticed
that the proponents of the Iraqi option inside and outside the U.S.
administration have been arguing quite convincingly that Turkey is an
essential component in the successful conduct of an Iraq operation.
However, Turkey's support of the United States in the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein is far from assured. Although the Turkish factor is surely only
one of many considerations currently being weighed in Washington, it is
obvious that, parallel to all other possible consequences, a move against
Saddam would test the strength of the U.S.-Turkish alliance." The Turkish government
quickly condemned the attacks of September 11 and backed the U.S. military
campaign in Afghanistan. In addition to Ankara's rhetorical support for
Washington, which is considered significant since Turkey is the only
member of NATO with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey permitted
the U.S. to use the country's bases and airspace, and shared intelligence
with Washington in conjunction with the Afghanistan campaign. However, Ecevit has
repeatedly indicated that cooperation with the United States against Iraq
would be beyond the limits of Turkey's solidarity with Washington. As
early as October 2001, when the U.S. military strikes on Afghanistan were
in their initial phase, Ecevit, in an interview with Turkey's Star TV,
expressed his view on this matter bluntly. When the interviewer
asked Ecevit where Turkey would stand if the U.S. intervened in Iraq
militarily, the prime minister responded: "An operation against Iraq
would not be right. Turkey cannot accept this. This operation may lead to
Turkey's dismemberment. It also will disrupt all the balances in the
Middle East . . . .We do not want any intervention against Iraq
whatsoever. As I have stated, it will create many dangers." He added
that the Turkish viewpoint on this issue had been conveyed to Washington
"at every opportunity for months and years." In a CNN interview on
October 16, 2001, Ecevit said that Turkey saw no reason for attacking
Iraq. He said that such an attack would destabilize the Middle East and
could lead to the partitioning of Iraq, which could create problems for
Turkey's "independence or territorial integrity." On November 7,
2001, he stated even more bluntly on CBS that Turkey "would not
support" U.S. action against Iraq. The prime minister did
not change his viewpoint after receiving a warm reception at the White
House from President George W. Bush in January 2002. The way he was
received was interpreted as a reflection of Washington's confidence that
Turkey would support a U.S. campaign against Iraq. The February 1, 2002
issue of the Executive Intelligence Review, a Washington periodical,
referred to Ecevit's January 17 press conference following his meetings
with Bush and other U.S. officials. Commenting on the possibility of
military action against Iraq, Ecevit said that ". . . a way out can
be found, of course, and should be found, but I hope that it will not
include a military operation, because such an operation could be
catastrophic for Turkey, even if Turkey did not participate in it. [Turkey
has] suffered a lot as a result of the Gulf crisis, the Gulf War, when
Iraq was virtually divided into three parts, particularly two parts; one
major part adjoining Turkey. And this has cost us a lot of money, a lot of
lives, and we don't want the same thing to happen again." On the eve of Vice
President Dick Cheney's visit to Turkey in March 2002, the last leg of his
Middle East tour to drum up support for an American drive against Iraq,
Ecevit, speaking on CNN International, said that Ankara did not support a
possible U.S.-led military operation against Iraq because it would harm
the Turkish economy, discourage foreign investment, and ruin the tourism
industry. He said that he would convey this view to Cheney during his
visit. The prime minister's
statements did not come as a surprise to those who had observed his
determined opposition to Özal's policy of cooperation with President
George H.W. Bush in the war against Iraq in 1990 and 1991. Ecevit visited
Saddam twice during that period as a member of parliament, and, as prime
minister, he has been accelerating the normalization of relations with
Iraq by sending an ambassador back to Baghdad and by promoting an increase
in bilateral trade. However, it would be
wrong to believe that Ecevit's views on Iraq do not reflect, to some
extent, the views of his coalition partners and many of his countrymen.
The continuing U.N. embargo against Iraq is estimated to have cost Turkey
over $30 billion, and it is widely believed to have contributed to the
country's current economic crisis. Moreover, although the
15-year-long government campaign against Kurdish separatists has ended,
there are genuine fears in Turkey that a break-up of Iraq could have a
domino effect. To underscore this
concern, General Kivrikoglu visited the Turkish city of Diyarbakir, near
the Iraqi border, on November 9, 2001, and reiterated that Turkey was
opposed to military action against Iraq. On more than one occasion, he has
voiced the Turkish military's displeasure over signals coming from
Washington on this matter. According to a Reuters dispatch on December 27,
2001, General Kivrikoglu said that "an independent Kurdish state
would be on the agenda" in northern Iraq if military action is taken
against Baghdad. The Turkish military's
position regarding the possibility of an American military onslaught
against Iraq was also revealed by the secretary general of Turkey's
influential National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinç. He
declared Turkey's opposition to such a campaign and emphasized in
unequivocal terms that Turkey would intervene, in the event of a break-up
of Iraq, in order to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq. (Hürriyet, June 14, 2002) Concern over a
potential American military operation against Iraq has by no means been
confined to the Turkish executive branch and military. Another voice of
disapproval has come from one of the most America-friendly institutions in
Turkey, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD).
TÜSIAD is the
mouthpiece of Turkey's most prominent industrialists and business people,
and is considered the most credible non-governmental organization in the
country. TÜSIAD's chairman, Tuncay Özilhan, on December 26,
2001, said that the view of Turkish business people concerning a possible
U.S. operation against Iraq had been shaped by the expected economic
repercussions of such an operation. He said that Turkish business people
did not approve of military action against Iraq at a time when Turkey's
exports to Iraq were increasing. These exports, he said, were coming from
southeastern Turkey, an important factor, at a time when the country
generally needed to step up its production and exports. A military
campaign against Iraq would not only have a negative economic impact on
Turkey, but it would also cause a significant imbalance in the region
politically, Özilhan added. The three influential
centers of power on the Turkish political stage, the executive branch, the
military, and the business world -- which the U.S. has relied upon in its
exclusive relationship with Turkey, are not enthusiastic about a potential
U.S. operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Turkish concerns are
focused on two major points: security and the economy. Ankara is worried
that an attack on Iraq might be followed by the dismemberment of Turkey's
southern neighbor, which, in turn, might further aggravate Turkey's
Kurdish question. Turkey is also wary of
the immense economic losses that such military action would entail. While
Turkey is struggling to overcome its economic crisis, any military
undertaking on its immediate periphery would have extremely adverse
effects on an already very fragile Turkish economy. Therefore, Ankara is
hoping that the United States will not ask it to support a military
operation against Iraq. Although Ankara has made clear that it does not
wish to provide this support, it cannot refuse to give it without serious
consequences. As a result, it is
entirely possible that, despite Turkey's strong reservations concerning
the matter, the Turkish government could still do an about-face and follow
Washington's lead on Iraq. Although Turkey's growing dependence on
Washington may oblige it to do so, it will not prevent Turkish leaders
from continuing to express grave reservations about U.S. intentions to
target the regime in Baghdad. Cengiz Candar is a
columnist for the Turkish daily Yeni Safak and a political analyst for the
Haberturk television news channel. The author of seven books, he was an
advisor to the late President Turgut Ozal on Middle Eastern issues from
1991 to 1993, a lecturer on Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilgi
University in Istanbul from 1997 to 1999, a Public Policy Scholar at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1999, and a Senior
Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2000.
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